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An earlier paper by the second author, entitled ‘Bella Americana: Some Consequences for the 
International Community’ [1], dealt with the background and consequences of the American 
dissociation from the international legal and political order created after World War II. The cur-
rent article examines this divergence in the light of United States foreign policy in general, 
pointing out that hegemony, unilateralism and pre-emptive strike together represent a certain 
‘constant’ in American foreign policy. The article then examines the so called ‘war on terror’, 
trying to understand its flaws within the context of American strategic culture. Arguably, how-
ever, what has changed after 9/11 is not just the nature of security threats as such but also 
the global environment in which these manifest themselves. Taking supremacy of the world’s 
military, technological and financial-economic superpower as a basis for further analysis, the 
issue becomes how to get that hegemony embedded in a multilateral setting. Here the notion 
of ‘policy by-products’ appears to open new venues. Continuing unilateralism, the article ar-
gues, would constitute a serious threat to American security proper. 
 
During the most recent US Presidential election campaign, Madeline Albright addressed a large-
ly American gathering at The Hague aimed at shoring up support for John Kerry as President. 
She prefaced her remarks with an ominous warning: America, thanks to a spate of reckless 
foreign policy decisions post 9/11 set in motion by a misguided Republican administration, 
had found itself in the middle of a perfect storm – floundering in what she argues is the worst 
foreign policy crisis to afflict post-modern America. Nothing short of voting Bush out and 
Kerry in would salvage the situation and bring it back to an even keel.  
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One year earlier, at the 2003 Pugwash Annual Conference, in Halifax, Nova Scotia, our 
founder and former president Joseph Rotblat in his widely applauded address made a fervent 
appeal to the International Community to influence American public opinion in turning the 
tide of US foreign policy. Alarmed by the Bush Administration’s intransigence on nuclear disar-
mament and the imminent danger of such a stance, Rotblat’s sentiments of ‘regime change’ in 
the US were in fact shared unofficially by many European Governments [2]. So unpopular are 
Bush and those around him overseas, that foreign leaders are reluctant to agree with anything 
the President says lest their own ratings take a dive. Quick to capitalise on the transatlantic 
divide, John Kerry suggested publicly that foreign leaders wanted to see him elected as Presi-
dent on November 2, 2004. He may not have been wrong. Foreign co-operation had come to a 
virtual standstill and governments in Europe and elsewhere were biding time and waiting it out 
till those November elections.  
Now that we know that Kerry has lost, it can be questioned whether it was realistic to 
expect wholesale changes in US foreign policy with a new President at the helm of affairs. The 
US and Americans are often chastised for their ignorance of world affairs and general geo-
graphical ineptness, but one could also argue that there is a fundamental misperception in the 
international community of the traditional role of foreign policy in American electoral cam-
paigns and an under-appreciation of bipartisanship on matters of national security. As impor-
tant an issue as national security is in the US at present and as crucial Bush’s misjudgement in 
the invasion of Iraq might become, the presidential election at the outset was already unlikely 
to become a referendum on the foreign policy of the Bush administration, as many European 
observers had assumed. There is a historical continuity in American foreign policy and one of 
the reasons for this is that it has never really been in the forefront of mainstream political 
debate. Moreover, there is little discussion on what constitutes a national security interest – 
global stability and championing the cause of political freedom and democracy in the world is 
generally seen as the linchpin of American foreign policy. Both candidates, as an international 
public is bound to notice every day, carry the stars and stripes on their lapel. The real differen-
ces arise around issues of strategy and how best to achieve these ends.  
The constant in American foreign policy 
American exceptionalism and its spill-over into foreign policy are based on a combination of 
three elements: hegemony (and with that the idea of expansion), unilateralism (‘going it alone’), 
and pre-emptive strike [3]. While it may well be argued that George W. Bush has distorted the 
notion of pre-emption (responding with a military attack to an immediate threat that could in 
no other way be dealt with) into aggressive prevention (responding militarily to future threats 
before these have manifested themselves as imminent), unilateralism itself is, indeed, not exclu-
sive to any one party but reflects rather a general mind-set in the American decision-making 
process. If there is a constant in American foreign policy, it can be found in affirmations of 
this form of exceptionalism especially in the aftermath of September 11th, 2001. The campaign 
rhetoric last year and the discourse on the ‘war on terror’ for example lend themselves not so 
much to differences in foreign policy perception but in strategy and how best to ‘win’ the war. 
Kerry’s contention therefore was that he was better equipped than his opponent to fight that 
‘war’; the theme itself and its dissociation from international law remained undisputed.  
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Throughout the 19th century, the main ‘foreign policy’ issue in American politics was 
actually an economic matter, namely the rate of tariffs on imports. The fundamental question 
of protectionism and the role of foreign capital were major concerns dividing the Democratic 
and Republican parties. It is also important to recall that the US constitution, with its division 
of powers between the judicial, legislative and executive branches of the federal government, 
establishes that the focus of foreign policy rests with the executive branch. The President’s 
main job is to provide for national security. While this may seem obvious, it plays a major role 
in how the Congress defers to the executive in matters of homeland security and the response 
to the terrorist threat following the attacks of September 11th, 2001. Americans expect their 
President to lead the country when it comes to issues of war and peace and the safety of the 
country. So the issue of ‘strong leadership’ is a very important qualification in the public mind 
when it comes to evaluating presidential candidates. 
But the constitution also reserves an essential foreign policy role to the US Senate. When 
Europeans criticise President Bush for not signing the Kyoto Protocol, for example, they 
should be aware that during President Clinton’s term, the Senate passed a resolution against 
the climate treaty by a vote of 95-0. Since the Senate must approve treaties by a two-thirds 
majority, it is clear that the impact of treaties on the domestic economy can outweigh foreign 
policy considerations.  
Notably, the most dramatic example of the role of the Senate in American foreign policy 
came during the period after the First World War. President Wilson, who had campaigned in 
1916 on the slogan ‘He kept us out of war’ failed to get Senate approval for the key element of 
the post-war settlement, the League of Nations treaty. In part, this was a result of the personal 
animosity between the Democrat, Wilson, and Senator Lodge, Republican of Massachusetts, 
the then majority leader in the Senate. Wilson elected not to take any senior Republican leaders 
to the Paris peace talks after the war, and the issue of America’s post-war role in the world 
became a partisan political issue. 
Partly as a result of this bitter experience, a bipartisan consensus emerged during and after 
World War II. Senator Vandenberg, also Republican and Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee during the Truman presidency, made the famous statement that ‘politics 
stopped at the water’s edge’, i.e., that foreign policy was not to be a partisan issue. The risks to 
the nation’s interests of having a coherent and reliable foreign policy – especially during the 
Cold War – outweighed the potential political gains. 
To say that during the Cold War American foreign policy was bipartisan is, of course, not 
entirely accurate. While the anti-communism of the McCarthy period had more to do with 
domestic politics than foreign policy, clearly there was a partisan element to the debate about 
national security then. And, foreign policy played a major part in presidential elections, despite 
the broad agreement between the two parties on America’s role in the world during the 1950s. 
Eisenhower campaigned on a peace platform during the Korean War. Kennedy argued the 
Republicans had paid insufficient attention to national defence, accusing his opponents of 
allowing a ‘missile gap’ to develop between the US and the Soviet Union. But it is safe to say 
that generally there was no fundamental difference between Democratic and Republican 
foreign policy. Indeed, arguably, under Kennedy, the US pursued a much more aggressive 
foreign policy which in fact led to the Vietnam engagement. 
Our conclusion is that obviously there is a lot more continuity in American foreign policy 
than changes of direction. Even the popular division of American policy into ‘multilateral’ 
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periods or ‘unilateral’ periods is misleading. The real division in American foreign policy is 
between internationalists and isolationists and the internationalists have been dominant for a 
long time in both parties. The US has traditionally viewed its national interests as consistent 
with the pursuit of global stability, and taken a practical approach to this overriding goal. When 
the US can obtain international support to this end, all the better; when not, as long as there is 
support in Congress for a particular course of action as being consistent with national security, 
then the issue is likely not to be politically contentious. So against this backdrop, what role 
should the international community play in influencing the direction of US foreign policy 
towards a multilateral embedding? 
In this respect, it is worth pointing out that the international community as such is an 
abstraction. There is no legal entity or person by that name. No doubt the United Nations, 
which consists of almost all the states in the world, reflects for certain purposes the views of or 
acts in the name of the states, and to that extent represents a formal international community. 
But whether it does so substantially is contingent. There have been notable cases where the 
United Nations has failed to act when confronted with situations, which on any view are of 
general concern, while in some instances these constitute an affront to ‘the conscience of 
humankind’ [4]. It is, indeed, difficult to accept that the states and peoples of the world are 
now in a position where their legitimate collective concerns as to particular conduct are to be 
channelled exclusively through the United Nations. In giving extensive powers and functions 
to the United Nations, and a limited monopoly in respect of control of the use of force, the 
states and the peoples invoked in the Charter did not give up entirely their individual capacity 
to act. World peace through world law [5] is, indeed, not yet a fully available option and most 
probably never will be. Formation and execution of power for the sake of security without a 
solid legal base remains inevitable, especially in a global context. Yet, the point is that 
whenever that takes place, its objectives and focus have to be questioned continuously – within 
and without the United Nations – while a genuine effort has to be made to incorporate not 
only political but military and economic power too, in an international legal setting. Insofar as 
global power formation cannot be based on principles of representative democracy, power 
sharing constitutes the next best. Essential in this respect is the incorporation in decision-
making of not primarily ‘the willing’ but precisely those constituent parts of international 
opinion-making that hold different views. Military power may, indeed, provide security, but it 
can also attract danger and lead to new threats [6], as illustrated rather horrendously in post-
war Iraq.  
The ‘War on Terror’ 
The initial post 9/11 reaction outside America was largely one of sympathy and concern but 
expressed in different forms. Many Arab and Muslim countries, as represented by important 
spiritual and religious leaders in the Middle East, were quick to condemn the attacks and made 
it clear that such acts were morally reprehensible and anathema to Islam. For some though, 
there was also a feeling that the chickens had come home to roost – America through its 
sometimes blundering, violent and insensitive policies brought this upon itself and perhaps the 
gravity of the attacks would now galvanise American opinion into deep introspection and 
effect positive change in American foreign policy. America might now finally take notice of the 
plight of other countries experiencing the same terrorism and unite nations in a genuine effort 
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to rid the world of this scourge. But nothing of the sort happened – the need for rational 
argument and nuanced analysis that could have (and should have) taken centre stage in main-
stream American politics was largely ignored in the corridors of power. Those with political 
axes to sharpen won the day and helped pave the way towards a second tragedy of missed 
opportunities. 
Notably, the whole idea of a ‘war on terror’ is a misnomer and a gross misstatement: there 
is no war that one could tangibly identify, let alone ‘win’. Indeed, while convenient for public 
consumption, the dynamics are complex – this is not a zero-sum game in which the ‘we win 
and you lose’ scenario works. Moreover, the entity currently called Al Qaeda is less an 
organisation than an ideology. The Arabic word qaeda can be translated as ‘base of operation’ 
or ‘foundation’, or alternatively as a ‘precept’ or ‘method’. Islamic militants always understood 
the term in the latter sense. In 1987, Abdullah Azzam, the leading ideologue for modern Sunni 
Muslim radical activists, called for ‘al-qaeda al-sulbah’ (a vanguard of the strong). He envisaged 
men who, acting independently, would set an example for the rest of the Islamic world and 
thus galvanise the umma (global community of believers) against its oppressors. It was the FBI 
– during its investigation of the 1998 US Embassy bombings in East Africa – which dubbed the 
loosely linked group of activists that Osama bin Laden and his aides had formed as ‘al Qaeda’. 
This decision was partly due to institutional conservatism and partly because the FBI had to 
apply conventional antiterrorism laws to an adversary that was in no sense a traditional terrorist 
or criminal organisation.  
Although bin Laden and his partners were able to create a structure in Afghanistan that 
attracted new recruits and forged links among pre-existing Islamic militant groups, they never 
created a coherent terrorist network in the way commonly conceived. Instead, al Qaeda 
functioned like a venture capital firm – providing funding, contacts, and expert advice to many 
different militant groups and individuals from all over the Islamic world.  
Today, the structure that was built in Afghanistan has been destroyed, and Osama bin 
Laden and his associates have scattered or been arrested or killed. There seems to be no longer 
a central hub for Islamic militancy. But the al Qaeda worldview, or ‘al Qaedaism’, is growing 
stronger every day. This radical internationalist ideology – sustained by anti-Western, anti-
Zionist, and anti-Semitic rhetoric – has adherents among many individuals and groups, few of 
whom are currently linked in any substantial way to bin Laden or those around him. They 
merely follow his precepts, models, and methods. They act in the style of al Qaeda, but they 
are only part of al Qaeda in the very loosest sense. That is why Israeli intelligence services now 
prefer the term ‘jihadi international’ instead of ‘al Qaeda’.  
Naturally, then, in their confrontation with these ideologically inspired terrorist networks, 
the United States is looking for allies and coalitions. What is questionable, however, is the 
distance taken from an emerging international legal order predicated on human rights princi-
ples. This reluctance to participate in the institutions of international law derives precisely from 
the home-grown contention that the rights of Americans are embodied in the US Constitution 
and are subject to local consent and national popular sovereignty. US non-ratification of inter-
national rights conventions and newly established institutions, however, run counter to US 
interests in the long run and puts a spoke in the wheel of international legitimacy and justice. 
This is, indeed, the main point we should like to make here: rather than confronting US security 
discourse with a normative human rights based discourse, we would advocate an imminent 
dialogue, based precisely on America’s own security concerns. 
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Strategic culture 
It is in politics that cultural conversations become most explicit: What ends should the nation 
pursue? What means should it use? Foreign policy is at a very high end on a spectrum of 
conversational explicitness because it concerns relations with outgroups; outgroups serve the 
dual purpose of acting as a source of national identity (we are not like them) and as a threat to 
national identity (we must resist becoming like them). Suffice it to say, it is only through 
definitions of the ‘other’ that we can carve out a distinctive niche for ourselves (us versus 
them).  
The disturbing linkage between socio-political naiveté and socio-political power became 
the underpinning of American politics when the administration quickly opted for an over-
simplistic ‘us versus them’ dualism (‘whoever is not for us is against us!’ [7]), immediately 
translated into the latest chapter of the story of ‘good against evil’. Any attempt to analyze the 
causes through self-examination was seen as comforting to the ‘enemy’ and those who 
suggested such analysis were vilified and branded ‘unpatriotic’. America has lost the moral 
ascendancy it inadvertently gained in the immediacy of the attacks and frittered away the 
opportunity to build a genuine domestic and foreign coalition that could have so easily 
emerged from the debris of 9/11. Instead, jingoistic, triumphalist rhetoric and a continuing 
tendency to see things in facile ways only served to feed the very Manichaeanism whose 
existence has already created so many problems.  
Crucial in our attempts to understand this reaction is the location of an American strategic 
culture, where strategic culture can be defined as a people’s distinctive style of thinking and 
dealing with the problems of national security. Strategic culture, more often than not, is 
couched in explanations of war and conflict. It is fuelled by the construction and maintenance 
of the boundaries of identity and invites a bi-partisan approach in the implementation of 
critical areas in foreign policy. The stars and stripes on the lapels of both President Bush and 
his opponent Kerry symbolise trust in ‘that greatest nation on earth’. ‘The President’s job’, 
Bush said in the context of his campaign for re-election, ‘is not to take an international poll; 
the President’s job is to defend America’.  
It is possible in this context then, to argue that there is a uniquely American approach to 
strategy. But is this strategic culture predicated on deeply rooted cultural traits embedded in the 
American polity (read ‘American exceptionalism’), on a more short-term, secular historical 
experience devoid of the cultural element, or on a fusion of both? Strategic culture in the 
American context, it seems, is none of these three: it is more the product of a ‘micro-culture’ at 
work and less amenable to explanation by any meaningful compartmentalisation of cultural 
thinking on foreign policy issues.  
The American foreign policy establishment has traditionally underestimated and at times 
ignored the importance of cultural influence when dealing with the threats and opportunities 
of the world around them. American ethnocentricism at the foreign policy level is precisely the 
result of this failure to understand value systems and cultural proclivities that could predict 
tendencies. It was during the cold war that the need to conceptualise strategic culture as an 
instrument of analysis first arose. While it could be argued that the constraints of bipolar 
rivalry largely nullified the domestic idiosyncrasies of nations, the reality today is quite 
different: The end of the Cold War will logically allow more artificial strategic cultures to give 
way to more culturally rooted ones, and it may become increasingly difficult to predict patterns 
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of interaction in the international arena without examining national security and foreign policy 
in the framework of cultural influence. However – and this is the critical point – in the frame-
work of international security, a culturally rooted strategic culture is predicated on national 
security imperatives and not civilizational ones. For instance, to speak of an ‘Islamic bomb’ is 
to deny the fact that the Islamic world is not a monolithic entity but a geographically and 
historically disparate group of states with very real differences. More accurately, it is extremely 
difficult to identify leaders of a civilization, and from a practical standpoint, it is virtually 
impossible to actualise threats made in the name of civilizations (like declarations of a holy war 
or jihad) precisely because the only underlying institutions that could put them into effect are 
nation states. Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ as we understand it is not a monolithic entity but rather 
a diverse ideology that manifests itself very differently in socio-political life – some positive, 
some negative: For instance, the Ikhwan (the Muslim Brotherhood) has aligned itself with the 
monarchy in Jordan and plays a moderate (even constructive) role in some Arab countries. 
They are more radical in Egypt, Algeria and The Occupied territories (Hamas). The point is – 
there is no conspiracy or ‘group dynamic’ within a divided Islamic world. Moreover, what 
counts is not fundamentalism but radical extremism. The American propensity to lump 
fundamentalists into the category of ‘dangerous extremists or terrorists’ is self-defeating. A 
more nuanced, better informed analysis is needed.  
It is only from a monolithic non-nuanced perspective that the war in Iraq made much 
more sense to the American war cabinet than focusing on dismantling and destroying Osama 
bin Laden and his network, although the latter always constituted a greater threat to America 
and the world than Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction (that in the end were 
never found). Bill Clinton was probably correct in asserting that in times of crisis and insecurity 
the American people want a leader that is ‘strong and wrong’ rather than one who is ‘weak and 
right’. And perhaps President Bush had to act quickly and decisively in order to restore 
confidence in the country and assuage the fears of the American people.  
But the Iraq misadventure may yet turn out to be the biggest strategic and tactical blunder 
since the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The quagmire that the Bush Administration precipitated will in all 
likelihood have disastrous long-term consequences for American foreign policy and further 
alienate allies already disillusioned by an unabashed display of arrogant American certitude. 
The damage may already have been done. Once the machinery for the foreign policy imple-
mentation process is set in motion, it becomes difficult (and often politically risky) to dislodge. 
It is extremely unlikely, for instance, that a new democratic administration will be able to roll 
back the current Iraq policy despite fundamental differences on the very question of whether it 
was right to go in there in the first place. The foreign policy apparatus simply does not allow 
for such wide-scale changes. For instance, since Kerry had voted in the US Senate for the war 
in Iraq this put the Democrats in a quandary and made it that much more difficult for their 
candidate to articulate clear policy objectives on Iraq that markedly differed from the ones 
adopted by the Bush administration. This may help explain why John Kerry in his campaign 
rhetoric had been unconvincing on Iraq and on how he planned to restore the loss of Ameri-
can credibility and respect around the world.  
Insofar, then, as election results matter in respect of American security choices in our 
world today, it was probably the Bush versus Gore ballot (and its interpretation by the 
Supreme Court in its 5:4 judgment) rather than the Bush versus Kerry vote that mattered a lot. 
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Elections, however, are like water under the bridge: the issue remains how to get US hegemony 
embedded in a multilateral setting. 
Multilateralism as a by-product of American security concerns 
Understandable as US unilateralism may be in the light of disappointments far from home, 
defending America today requires a substantial change in strategic culture. It will not have 
much effect, however, to confront unilateralist national security discourse with a Universal hu-
man rights-based communication. But it is precisely within the context of current concerns 
with international terrorism that the international legal order manifests its primary significance. 
To clarify what is meant here, we should like to present the notion of policy by-products. 
The term ‘by-product’ means that production is not primarily aimed at, nor automatic; yet 
it may be regarded as essential. Let us take democracy as an illustration here. Notably, that 
system implies the constitution and acceptance of government by its citizens or, in other 
words, legitimacy. Indeed, for Fukuyama [8], the advocate of liberal democracy as ‘the end of 
history’, a regime is democratic when it is legitimised through the consent of the ruled. Here, 
democracy and legitimisation become synonyms. It is also possible to see legitimacy as an 
essential by-product of democracy [9]. The term ‘by-product’ means, indeed, that the ‘produc-
tion’ of legitimacy is not automatic; nevertheless it is essential for without it democracy will 
lose its meaning. ‘Without the citizens’ support, who recognise the regime as being legitimate, a 
political democracy cannot survive’ [10]. A problem with pure by-products is, generally, that 
they cannot be aimed at, even where their production is regarded as essential. Thus, paradoxi-
cally, politicians in power cannot just aim at legitimacy, through major efforts in public rela-
tions for example. Rather, they have to aim at the right policies and if these are successful they 
might produce ‘people’s subjective perceptions’ [11] that constitute the regime’s legitimacy.  
In a similar vein, American strategic culture’s pre-occupation with national security implies 
that a close relationship between the US and the international legal order cannot be aimed at 
directly. Indeed, in the final analysis, both the international community and the US must break 
the habit of making assumptions based on their own wish lists. As long as American primacy 
reigns supreme, the US is not going to be bogged down by international treaties or international 
law if it perceives its national security to be under threat. And no country in its present form is 
going to develop a defence capability that rivals that of the US so that it could engage in pre-
emptive actions on the global stage. What is abundantly clear though is that global interdepen-
dence, especially in light of powerful destabilising forces at work such as ‘al Qaeda’, has never 
assumed greater significance than it has today. It is precisely the global chaos that international 
terrorism aims at, which requires a response that is based on the international rule of law. 
Moreover, going it alone all the time the US would make itself as a country and American 
citizens wherever they might find themselves, a primary target of Jihad ideology and conse-
quently of its terrorist methods. And finally, the international community would be rendered 
impotent without US support [1]. The sooner each side accepts these realities, the sooner they 
can start building a viable common agenda that will bring them out of ‘the perfect storm’ 
(Madeline Albright) and into calmer waters. 
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